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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cars, rice farming, coal mining, power plants, and cattle belching all have 
one thing in common: they emit greenhouse gases.1  In fact, when measuring 
greenhouse gas emissions, “[a] herd of cattle belching can be worse than a 
highway full of Hummers.”2  It seems strange and somewhat unlikely, but 
due to the diversity in the types of greenhouse gases that can be emitted, 
greenhouse gas emissions can come from numerous sources; including cars 
and power plants emitting carbon dioxide and cows belching methane. 
Greenhouse gases are not just varied in means of production, they are also 
paradoxical.  A paradox is defined as something “that is seemingly 
contradictory or opposed to common sense and yet is . . . true.”3  Greenhouse 
gases are one such paradox: “[t]he greenhouse effect keeps the earth warm 
and habitable . . . [and] is clearly a good thing. But the enhanced greenhouse 
effect means even more of the sun’s heat is trapped [in the earth’s 
atmosphere], causing global temperatures to rise,” which is clearly a bad 
thing.4  Greenhouse gases, therefore, are necessary to life on Earth as they 
warm the earth’s surface and, by this means, make the earth inhabitable.5  
However, “as the concentrations of these gases continue to increase . . . the 
Earth’s temperature is climbing [significantly] above past levels.”6  Among 
other things, this results in, an increased frequency of storms, droughts, and 
floods, an increased danger to coastal areas due to the rise of sea levels, as 
well as a surge in diseases throughout the world.7  Therefore, it seems 
greenhouse gases cannot be eliminated completely, and yet, they cannot 
continue to be produced at the current rate. 
Greenhouse gas emissions have, in fact, drastically increased throughout 
time, with “[l]evels of several important greenhouse gases . . . increas[ing] 
by about twenty-five percent since large-scale industrialization began around 
150 years ago.”8  This surge has continued in recent times, as measured by 
                                                                                                                   
 1 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED: WHY WE NEED A GREEN REVOLUTION 
– AND HOW IT CAN RENEW AMERICA 34–35 (2008). 
 2 Id. at 35. 
 3 Paradox Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/par 
adox (last visited Dec. 19, 2011). 
 4 FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 36. 
 5 Climate Change Basics, EPA U.S. ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY (June 14, 2012), http:// 
www.epa.gov/climatechange/basicinfo.html. 
 6 Id. 
 7 SEBASTIAN OBERTHÜR & HERMANN E. OTT, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL 
CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4–5 (1999). 
 8 Greenhouse Gases, Climate Change, and Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 2, 
2004), http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/chapter1.html. 
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the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which reports that 
between the years of 1970 and 2004 greenhouse gas emissions have 
increased by 70%.9 
The IPCC has also found that although some mitigation policies have 
been effective in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, they have not yet had 
the effect of counteracting the steady increase of those emissions.10  If 
current international measures for mitigating greenhouse gases are not 
modified, the IPCC has projected that greenhouse gas emissions will 
continue to increase during the next several decades.11  Adding to the 
complexity of the situation, modifying current measures cannot be 
accomplished by any country acting on its own, as no single country is 
currently producing more than one-fifth of the world’s greenhouse gas 
emissions.12  Only a global solution would have a significant impact on 
reducing the levels of these gases.13 
The international community has taken note of the greenhouse gas 
problem and has undertaken several different approaches to address the 
issue.  The Kyoto Protocol is one such approach.  The Protocol is an 
international agreement that seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions on a 
global scale.14  The Protocol attempts to reduce emissions by setting binding 
emission targets for its Annex I Member States, composed of thirty-seven 
developed countries and the European Union.15  The Kyoto Protocol holds 
these countries to binding commitments by requiring them to reduce their 
greenhouse emissions by an average of 5% against 1990 levels, over the 
period of 2008–2012.16  The Protocol also encourages, but does not commit, 
                                                                                                                   
 9 TERRY BARKER ET AL., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 3 (B. Metz 
et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4wg3/ar4-wg3-sp 
m.pdf.  
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 4. 
 12 S. GUPTA & DENNIS A. TIRPAK, Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangements, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING 
GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE 745, 768 (B. Metz et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/as 
sessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-chapter13.pdf. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done 
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
 15 See id. art. 3 (referring to Annex B of the Protocol, which lists the emission targets set for 
Annex I countries). 
 16 Id. 
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non-Annex I countries, composed of mainly developing nations, to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions.17 
The Kyoto Protocol thus symbolizes the world’s realization that 
greenhouse gas emission levels are an international issue that must be 
addressed on a global scale.18  In spite of this realization, the Protocol, until 
recently when reinstated for another five-year period during the Durban 
Conference, was set to expire in 2012 with several of the major Annex I 
countries refusing to commit to a second period at all.19  Additionally, the 
world’s two biggest greenhouse gas emitters, the United States and China, 
were never parties to the Kyoto Protocol and are not parties to the five-year 
extension The United States seemed reluctant to sign on at all.20  The 
unwillingness of the world’s biggest emitters to sign on to the Protocol, 
coupled with the fact that some of the world’s largest emitters are developing 
countries who have no binding commitments under the Protocol, has 
prompted many critics to label the Kyoto Protocol a failure.21  According to 
one critic: “If cutting global carbon emissions was [the Kyoto Protocol’s] 
aim, the UN scheme has failed.”22 
The lack of a significant and effective international agreement on the 
reduction of greenhouse gases is a huge issue.  In order to fight climate 
change, and specifically to reduce greenhouse emission levels, there must be 
a global consensus.23  Without international cooperation it is difficult to see 
how any significant impact upon greenhouse gas levels will be realized as 
“no single country emits more than approximately 20% of global emissions,” 
thus making it evident that an effective solution must involve the global 
community.24  
                                                                                                                   
 17 See id. art. 12 (establishing a mechanism for non-Annex I countries to achieve sustainable 
development and using the term “developing country Parties” to describe those benefiting from 
the mechanism). 
 18 Essential Background: Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (follow “Kyoto Protocol” 
hyperlink) (last visited June 28, 2012). 
 19 See Launching the Green Climate Fund, in United Nations Convention on Climate 
Change, Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28–Dec. 11, 2011, Addendum: Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties at Its 17th Sess., 55, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 
2012), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf. 
 20 See id. (noting a five to eight year extension period for the Kyoto Protocol); UN Climate 
Talks: Pretty Basic, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2011. 
 21 See, e.g., UN Climate Talks: Pretty Basic, supra note 20. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See GUPTA & TIRPAK, supra note 12 (stating that “successful solutions will need to 
engage multiple countries”). 
 24 Id. 
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Part II of this Note considers why greenhouse gas emissions are 
detrimental to the environment and must be controlled. It details how 
greenhouse gas emissions are produced, how they affect the environment, 
and why they are so harmful.  Part III will examine the original Kyoto 
Protocol and its goals and initiatives.  This part will detail the Protocol’s 
structure, focusing on its “common but differentiated responsibilities” 
principle,”25 its binding nature, and the market-based mechanisms it has 
employed to reduce greenhouse emissions.  Part IV will briefly touch on the 
international debate over the Protocol’s effectiveness, address the 
implications of the Durban Conference, which has re-implemented the 
original Kyoto agreement for five more years, and then take the stance that a 
new and refreshed Kyoto agreement is absolutely necessary.  Part V will 
conclude by making suggestions on how to restructure this new agreement in 
order to incentivize countries to sign a new protocol and establish a strong 
global commitment to reducing greenhouse gas levels and fighting climate 
change. 
II.  GREENHOUSE GASES 
Since the beginning of pre-historic times, the world’s population, and thus 
its activity, has continually increased.  This burst of human activity has 
resulted in an increase of various human by-products, including the emission 
of greenhouse gases.26  In fact, in the last century the rise in human activity 
has resulted in a significant increase of greenhouse gases and, thus, a 
substantial change in the earth’s atmosphere and climate.27 
Greenhouse gases can be emitted both naturally and via human activity.28  
Emissions can occur naturally through sources such as “animal and plant 
respiration, volcanic eruptions, and ocean-atmosphere exchange.”29  They 
can also occur as a result of human activity, through the “combustion of 
fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas in power plants, automobiles, industrial 
facilities and other sources.”30  In fact, the majority of greenhouse gas 
emissions occur as a result of fossil fuel combustion coming from the 
                                                                                                                   
 25 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 10. 
 26 Causes of Climate Change, EPA U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climat 
echange/science/causes.html (last visited June 28, 2012). 
 27 Id. 
 28 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1 (recognizing that greenhouse gas emissions can come from 
rice farming, petroleum drilling, coal mining, animal defecation, and cattle belching).  
 29 Causes of Climate Change, supra note 26. 
 30 Nuclear Energy and the Environment, NEI: NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/ 
resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/protectingtheenvironment/factsheet/nuclearenergyandtheen
vironment/?page=1 (last visited June 11, 2012). 
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operation of cars, aircrafts, and other machines.31  Thus, greenhouse gases 
come from a wide variety of both natural and unnatural sources.  
Regardless of their source, greenhouse gases operate by trapping heat in 
the Earth’s atmosphere.32  Generally, if these gases are not present, when 
sunlight hits the Earth’s surface it is released back into space as infrared 
radiation.33  However, when greenhouse gases are present in the atmosphere, 
they “absorb this infrared radiation and trap its heat in the atmosphere.”34  
The effect of this absorption is to warm the earth’s surface as well as the 
lower portion of the earth’s atmosphere.35 
Greenhouse gases, once emitted, can remain in the atmosphere “for tens 
to hundreds of years.”36  This longevity coupled with the steady rise of 
emissions, has been deemed responsible for the global increase in average 
temperatures during the twentieth century.37  Scientists predict that if 
greenhouse gas emission levels continue to increase at current levels “by the 
middle of the next century the Earth's global temperature may be 1 to 3° 
Celsius higher than today.”38  Although an increase of several degrees 
Celsius may seem insignificant, it becomes more ominous when compared to 
the fact that “the difference in global average temperature between an ice age 
and an interglacial period like we are in now. . . is a mere five to six degrees 
Celsius.”39  Therefore, it is evident that a seemingly small change in global 
temperatures can lead to drastic differences in the environment.40 
Complicating the issue further is that these increases in greenhouse gases 
do not necessarily correlate to the size of the population within a certain 
country, making it hard to regulate among countries based only on 
differences in population.41  Rather greenhouse emissions can be related 
either to the level of industrialization and development in a country or to the 
                                                                                                                   
 31 OBERTHÜR & OTT, supra note 7, at 7. 
 32 Causes of Climate Change, supra note 26. 
 33 Energy and the Environment Explained: Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=environment_about_ghg (last updated 
Apr. 12, 2011). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES 
9 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/pdfs/climateindicators-full.pdf. 
 37 Id. at 2. 
 38 M. Pidwirny, The Greenhouse Effect, in FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY (2d 
ed. 2009), available at http://www.physicalgeography.net/fundamentals/7h.html.  
 39 FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 37.  
 40 Id. 
 41 KEVIN A. BAUMERT, TIM HERZOG & JONATHAN PERSHING, NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS: 
GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 11–12 (Dec. 2005), available 
at http://pdf.wri.org/navigating_numbers.pdf. 
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sheer size of the population in the country.42  In fact, “[m]ost of the 
largest . . .  emitters have large economies, large populations, or both.”43  As 
a prime example of this issue, the United States “produced about 19% of 
global carbon dioxide emissions . . . in 2008 . . . and 18% in 2009,” and yet it 
accounted for only 5% of the world’s population.44  
Despite developed countries like the United States producing high levels 
of greenhouse gases,45 studies predict that, “[m]uch of the increase 
in . . . emissions is expected to occur in the developing world where 
emerging economies, including China and India, fuel economic development 
with fossil energy.”46  Thus it is not just the developed and industrialized 
world that threatens to contribute heavily to the greenhouse gas problem, but 
also the developing world, which is burning fossil fuels at an increased rate 
in order to jumpstart its economic development. 
III.  THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement, adopted in Kyoto, 
Japan, on December 11, 1997, that has attempted to deal with the issue of 
greenhouse gas emissions.47  The agreement entered into force on February 
16, 2005,48 and currently includes 194 countries and the European Union as 
parties to the Protocol.49  The Protocol aims to deal with six specific 
greenhouse gases: (1) carbon dioxide; (2) methane; (3) nitrous oxide; (4) 
hydrofluorocarbons; (5) perfluorocarbons; and (6) sulphur hexafluoride.50  
Of the six gases covered, carbon dioxide is by far the most prevalent in the 
atmosphere, with 76.7% of global greenhouse gas emissions being attributed 
to it.51  
                                                                                                                   
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Energy and the Environment Explained: Outlook for Future Emissions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=environment_outlook_f or_emiss 
ions (last updated Sept. 20, 2011). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Essential Background: Kyoto Protocol, supra note 18. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Essential Background: Basic Facts & Figures, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/basic facts_figures/items/6246.php 
(follow “Basic Facts & Figures” hyperlink) (last visited June 29, 2012).  
 50 UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Fact Sheet: The Need 
for Mitigation 1, 1 (2009) [hereinafter The Need for Mitigation], available at http://unfccc.int/ 
files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press_factsh_mitigation.pdf. 
 51 Id. 
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The Kyoto Protocol is linked to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),52 an international treaty adopted 
on May 9, 1992, that entered into force on March 21, 1994.53  The ultimate 
goal of the UNFCCC is “to stabili[z]e greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous human interference with 
the climate system.”54  The Kyoto Protocol was later created as a 
complement to the UNFCCC and was approved at the 3rd COP.55 
Although the Kyoto Protocol and its founding Convention are 
counterparts of one another, they differ in that the UNFCCC simply 
encourages developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, 
while the Protocol commits them to doing so.56  Specifically, under Article 3, 
the Kyoto Protocol commits those countries designated as Annex I countries 
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 5% below 1990 levels over the 
period of 2008–2012.57  These Annex I countries consist of forty-one 
developed countries as well as the European Union.58   
The Kyoto Protocol, like its founding Convention, the UNFCCC, 
differentiates between developed and developing countries by utilizing the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.59  This principle, 
detailed most clearly in the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, states:  
In view of the different contributions to global environmental 
degradation, States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities.  The developed countries acknowledge the 
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of 
sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies 
                                                                                                                   
 52 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC], available at http:// 
unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. 
 53 Issues in the Negotiation Process: A Brief History of the Climate Change Process, 
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/cop7/issu 
es/briefhistory.html (last visited June 29, 2012).  
 54 Introduction to the UNFCCC and Its Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FWK. CONV. ON 
CLIM. CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/press/fact_sheets/items/4978.php (last visited June 29, 2012).  
 55 Id.  
 56 Essential Background: Kyoto Protocol, supra note 18. 
 57 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 3, para. 1.  
 58 List of Annex I Countries to the Convention, UNITED NATIONS FWK. CONV. ON CLIM. 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php (last visited 
June 29, 2012). 
 59 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 10. 
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place on the global environment and of the technologies and 
financial resources they command.60 
This principle therefore strives to hold developed countries to a higher 
standard, as its drafters believe that those societies and their by-products 
have caused more impact on the global environment than those of developing 
nations.61   
The UNFCCC took this common but differentiated principle even further 
by stating that developed nations are not only responsible for reducing their 
emissions, but they must also provide funding and resources to assist 
developing country parties with the costs of compliance.62  Therefore, under 
the UNFCCC, developed countries are not only charged with the 
responsibility of mitigating their own greenhouse gas emissions, but they 
must also help fund developing countries in adhering to their obligations. 
The common but differentiated responsibilities principle was later 
incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol as well.  As a practical matter, this 
principle resulted in the Kyoto Protocol member countries being divided into 
two groups: Annex I and non-Annex I countries.63  Developing countries, or 
non-Annex I countries, have not made binding commitments to reduce 
greenhouse emissions, while developed countries, or Annex I countries, have 
agreed to: 
●  Specific binding emission targets to be achieved in the 
2008–2012 commitment period . . .  
●  Targets [that] can be achieved by domestic action and by 
the use of international market mechanisms.64 
Therefore, Annex I countries are committed to binding targets while 
developing countries, in recognition of the fact that they have not contributed 
as much to the greenhouse gas problem, have made no commitments 
whatsoever. 
Annex I countries that have signed the Protocol are expected to meet their 
binding greenhouse gas emissions targets mainly via national measures.65  
                                                                                                                   
 60 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz., 
June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 7, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1(vol. I), 31 I.L.M. 874 (June 14, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
 61 Compare id. (speaking of the responsibility of developed nations), with id. princ. 6 
(calling for special attention the needs of developing nations). 
 62 UNFCCC, supra note 52, arts. 4(2)(a), 4(3). 
 63 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14. 
 64 The Need for Mitigation, supra note 50, at 4. 
 65 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 2(1)(a).  
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National measures are detailed in Article 2(1)(a) of the Protocol and include, 
but are not limited to, the following: enhancing energy efficiency, protecting 
greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs, promoting sustainable forms of 
agriculture, researching new forms of renewable energy, phasing out 
incentives and tax deductions for all greenhouse gas emitting sectors, 
encouraging reform in those sectors, as well as generally taking steps to limit 
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.66 
Although Annex I countries are to use these national measures in order to 
meet their targets, the Kyoto Protocol also affords them, and in some cases 
non-Annex I countries, the opportunity to meet “their targets by way of three 
market-based mechanisms”: 
[i] Emissions trading 
[ii] Clean development mechanism (CDM) 
[iii] Joint implementation.67 
The emission trading mechanism set out in Article 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol created a new commodity.68  The emissions trading mechanism 
allows those countries that have accepted greenhouse gas targets, or Annex I 
countries, to sell or buy additional emission units if they have units to spare 
or need more units.69  This mechanism, however, does not apply to non-
Annex I countries.70 
The second mechanism is the clean development mechanism (CDM), 
which is detailed in Article 12 of the Protocol.71  This mechanism allows 
countries with binding targets to implement emission-reducing projects in 
developing countries and “use the certified emission reductions [CERs] 
accruing from such project activities to contribute to compliance with part of 
their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments.”72  These 
projects must be registered and are issued CERs only if approved.73  
The CDM allows countries to register and accrue credits for numerous 
types of projects with the exception of projects involving nuclear power and 
                                                                                                                   
 66 Id. 
 67 Essential Background: Kyoto Protocol, supra note 18. 
 68 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 17. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See id. (discussing Annex B countries, which are also Annex I countries, without 
mention of developing nations). 
 71 Id. art. 12. 
 72 Id. art. 12(3)(b). 
 73 What Is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)?, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2011), available 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/26/clean-development-mechanism/. 
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deforestation.74  This mechanism, like the other two, is utilized to help 
Annex I countries meet their targets.75  However, a key difference between 
the CDM and the other two market-based mechanisms is that the CDM’s 
purpose is to allow both Annex I and non-Annex I countries to participate.76  
The CDM accomplishes this goal by assisting non-Annex I parties in 
achieving sustainable development while also helping Annex I countries 
comply with their emission targets.77  The CDM’s inclusion of all countries 
allows “[d]eveloping countries [to] benefit from new funding opportunities, 
and industrialized economies . . . to meet their reduction targets at a lower 
cost.”78  The CDM is the first global investment scheme of its kind,79 and it 
has registered 4,297 projects thus far, with 95 projects currently requesting 
registration.80  It is seen as by far the most successful of the three 
mechanisms created by the Kyoto Protocol.81 
The final mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol is the joint implementation 
mechanism, detailed in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol.82  The joint 
implementation mechanism allows Annex I countries to invest in greenhouse 
gas reducing projects in other Annex I countries in order to earn emission 
reduction units that are counted towards their binding emission targets.83 
To ensure that Annex I countries adhere to their binding greenhouse gas 
emissions targets, the Kyoto Protocol also maintains a compliance 
mechanism.84  This mechanism is “designed to strengthen the Protocol’s 
environmental integrity, support the carbon market’s credibility and ensure 
transparency of accounting by Parties.”85  In effect, the compliance 
                                                                                                                   
 74 Id. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Rolf H. Weber & Aline Darbellay, Regulation and Financial Intermediation in the Kyoto 
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 271, 273 (2010). 
 79 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechani 
sm/items/2718.php (last visited June 29, 2012). 
 80 CDM in Numbers, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html (last visited June 29, 2012). 
 81 What Is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)?, supra note 73.  
 82 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 6; Joint Implementation, UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanis 
ms/joint_implementation/items/1674.php (last visited June 29, 2012). 
 83 Joint Implementation, supra note 82. 
 84 An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_ 
protocol/compliance/items/3024.php (last visited June 29, 2012). 
 85 Id. 
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mechanism and its two branches are to thoroughly assess the performance of 
all Annex I parties. 
The Protocol’s compliance mechanism consists of a Compliance 
Committee that is subdivided into a facilitative branch and an enforcement 
branch.86  Each branch is composed of ten members: five from the UN 
official regions–Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central and 
Eastern Europe, and Western Europe and others, one from a small island 
developing state, two from Annex I States,; and two from non-Annex I 
States.87   
Each branch also has its own separate functions: “the facilitative branch 
aims to provide advice and assistance to Parties in order to promote 
compliance, whereas the enforcement branch has the responsibility to 
determine consequences for Parties not meeting their commitments.”88  The 
power allocated to the facilitative branch allows it not only to advise 
countries on how to achieve their targets and reduce emissions, but also gives 
it the power to help flag potential non-compliance.89  In contrast, the 
enforcement branch not only notes a Party’s non-compliance but also 
determines a course of action to be taken to remedy the non-compliance.90   
In order to determine compliance, the two branches of the Compliance 
Committee mainly base their determinations on reports from experts, 
subsidiary bodies, member Parties, and intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations.91 
IV.  KYOTO PROTOCOL ISSUES AND EXPIRATION 
Through its mechanisms, both market-based and compliance, the Kyoto 
Protocol has aimed to combat the problem of climate change by reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions on a global scale.  However, the Protocol has hit 
some significant bumps along the way.  One of its most serious setbacks 
occurred when the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitter, the United States, 
refused to ratify the Protocol, stating that complying with the Protocol 
“would harm the [U.S.] economy and [that the Protocol] is flawed by the 
lack of restrictions on emissions by China and India.”92  Additionally, there 
                                                                                                                   
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Bush: Kyoto Treaty Would Have Hurt Economy, MSNBC.COM (June 30, 2005), http://  
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8422343/ns/politics/t/bush-kyoto-treaty-would-have-hurt-economy/#.  
ToiEjc2S7Og. 
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have been many criticisms that the targets set in the Protocol are insufficient 
and will not result in any substantial reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, 
with some critics going so far as to state that “[e]ven if it were implemented 
at 100% effectiveness, the Kyoto Protocol barely represents any progress at 
all, both because its reduction targets are low and emissions in developing 
countries will continue to grow unchecked.”93 
Though the effectiveness of the agreement is highly debated,94 it can 
hardly be refuted that the Kyoto Protocol has prompted a global conversation 
on climate change and greenhouse emissions.  Even in its initial phases, the 
Protocol was seen as “an important first step towards a truly global emission 
reduction regime that will stabilize [greenhouse gas] emissions, and 
provide . . . the essential architecture for any future international agreement 
on climate change.”95   
Until recently, the Kyoto Protocol was set to expire in 2012,96 with 
neither a concrete plan to reinvigorate it for a second commitment period nor 
another agreement to take its place, thus leaving the international community 
without an environmental agreement.97  Additionally, three of the major 
countries that signed the original commitment, Japan, Russia, and Canada, 
have refused to take part in a second commitment period unless the Protocol 
is modified to bind China and the United States.98  In an attempt to solve 
these issues and help find a global consensus on how to reinvigorate and 
restructure the Kyoto Protocol, several international conferences have been 
held. 
The first attempt at reinvigorating the Kyoto Protocol occurred at the 
fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) at the Copenhagen 
Conference in December 2009.99  The Conference was attended by 
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approximately 120 heads of state, and was seen as “rais[ing] climate change 
policy to the highest political level.”100  However, though hopes were high 
for the Copenhagen Conference, it concluded with only the signing of a 
political agreement, the Copenhagen Accord, negotiated by approximately 
twenty-eight countries.101  The Copenhagen Accord’s main goals were to 
limit “climate change to no more than two degrees Celsius, [to establish] 
systems of ‘pledge and review’ for mitigation commitments or actions by 
both developed and developing countries, and [to identify] significant new 
financial resources.”102  However, several countries, including Bolivia, 
Sudan, and Venezuela, objected to the Accord, and thereby prevented the 
Convention from formally adopting the agreement.103  Therefore, because the 
Copenhagen Accord was simply a political agreement, the substantive pieces 
of the Accord were never technically accepted.104  
Another attempt to discuss and detail the Kyoto Protocol was recently 
made at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Panama.105  This 
meeting, which began on October 1, 2011, and culminated on October 7, 
2011, was the last official Conference held before the annual Climate 
Change Conference, which took place in Durban during November 2011.106  
It resulted in very little headway and, according to commentators, “barely 
made progress in resolving the thorniest issues, stalling negotiations to 
conclude a global agreement later this year in Durban, South Africa to save 
the planet from overheating.”107 
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A. COP 17: Durban, South Africa 
A third meeting was held in Durban, South Africa at the seventeenth 
meeting of the COP on November 28, 2011.108  The Conference’s aim was to 
host “discussions . . . to advance, in a balanced fashion, the implementation 
of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. . . .”109  Many saw the Conference 
as the final opportunity “to ensure that internationally binding emission 
reduction commitments with international rules and compliance continue and 
do not lapse or end altogether.”110   
The Durban Conference, unlike its predecessors, made some headway.  
First, Durban officially launched the Green Climate Fund, originally 
contemplated in the Copenhagen Accord, as an operating entity of the 
Convention’s financial mechanism under Article 11.111  The fund’s purpose 
is to help support various projects, policies, and activities in developing 
countries.112  It is unclear, however, how the Green Climate Fund will be 
funded as the Conference did not identify a means for financing.113  The final 
version of the Green Climate Fund is to be detailed at the eighteenth COP.114 
The Durban Conference also resulted in the Durban Platform, which 
“legally require[s] all nations — including the two biggest emitters, China 
and the United States — to meet as-yet-unspecified emissions targets.”115  
The Durban Platform’s main aim was to initiate a process to develop a 
Protocol that would legally bind all countries.116  The Platform, therefore, 
envisions “a non-binding agreement to reach an agreement by 2015,” in 
which both developing and developed countries have legally binding 
obligations.117  Some critics, however, believe that the Durban Platform is 
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not as significant a step as it appears to be but is simply legal jargon that will 
delay any significant action for a number of years.118  It remains to be seen 
how the world’s nations will structure this legal agreement, and if in fact 
they will be able to agree to bind both developing and developed nations. 
Perhaps most significantly, the Durban Conference also declared that a 
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is set to begin in January 
2013 and end in either December 2017 or December 2020.119  By thus 
stating, the Durban Conference officially announced a second Kyoto 
Protocol commitment period.  However, the Conference did not change the 
emission targets or the binding commitments for this second Kyoto Protocol 
period but instead “renew[ed] . . . the fraying 1997 emissions agreement that 
sets different terms for advanced and developing countries, for several more 
years.”120  Therefore, this second commitment period is simply an extension 
of the first, with no significant additions or edits.121 
Thus, although the Durban Conference made some progress, it remains 
highly debated whether the Conference was a success or simply another 
example of the COP kicking the can down the road.122  Regardless, it seems 
that the door has been left open for the formation of a new and restructured 
Kyoto Protocol.  
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V.  ANALYSIS 
The Kyoto Protocol, although a good first step, is by no means a perfect 
solution to the world’s greenhouse gas problem.123  The Protocol initiated a 
process whereby countries could take note of their individual impact on the 
global greenhouse gas levels and pledge to reduce that impact 
appropriately.124  The Protocol also gave countries a new way to meet their 
reductions targets by introducing three market-based mechanisms.125  
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the Kyoto Protocol started a 
necessary global conversation on the issue of greenhouse gas emissions and 
what should be done about the problem.126 
Despite all of the Kyoto Protocol’s contributions, a reinvigorated Protocol 
will necessitate that countries address several very important issues.  If these 
issues are not addressed, the Protocol will fail and be rendered a useless 
political agreement.  
A.  Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
The first issue that must be discussed and decided is which countries 
should be held responsible for reducing greenhouse gas emissions going 
forward.  Should the list of Annex I countries stay the same, or should more 
countries be added?  Most importantly, should the Protocol even discern 
between Annex I and non-Annex I countries? 
The Kyoto Protocol and its founding charter, the UNFCCC, currently 
differentiate between member countries by using the common but 
differentiated responsibilities principle.127  This principle begins with the 
idea that “certain risks affect . . . every nation on earth . . . includ[ing] not 
only [risks such as] the climate and the ozone . . . but [also] all risk-related 
global public goods.”128  These risks are deemed to be common, as all 
countries, regardless of development or economic prosperity, share them.129  
The principle also dictates that regardless of these common risks the 
responsibilities attributed to each nation should be differentiated: “not all 
countries should contribute equally . . . [and] some nations . . . [should be 
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charged] with carrying a greater burden than others.”130  A multi-national 
agreement can implement this principle in multiple ways.131  For example, it 
can allow some parties more time to implement certain measures, give them 
special defenses, or turn a blind eye to areas of non-compliance.132 
The Kyoto Protocol utilizes the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities in the latter manner.  It does so by committing developed 
countries to binding reductions of their greenhouse gas emissions, while 
simply urging developing countries to reduce their emissions, thereby 
effectively overlooking a developing country’s non-compliance.133  The 
justification for this principle stems from the idea that historically not only 
have developed countries contributed more to the climate change problem, 
but they also have greater capabilities to address the problem.134  In contrast, 
developing countries have not been emitting greenhouse gases for as long a 
period of time, as they have taken longer to develop and industrialize their 
economies.135  Additionally, due to this lag in industrialization, developing 
countries lack the economic and technological resources to deal with the 
greenhouse emissions problem.136  Therefore, the justification concludes that 
developed countries should shoulder a greater portion of the greenhouse gas 
reduction burden, as historically they have contributed exponentially more to 
the greenhouse gas emission problem and they have the funds to make the 
problem better.137 
Another reason used to support the application of the common but 
differentiated principle is that if developing countries are bound to 
greenhouse gas targets, implementing this obligation will severely burden 
their economies.138  Developing countries worry that if they take on 
substantial environmental obligations under the Kyoto Protocol these 
obligations will come at the expense of economic development as they will 
need to utilize precious financial resources to build environmentally friendly 
infrastructures, rather than invest them in building up their economies.139   
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The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 
Stockholm illustrated one of the first uses of this reasoning when the 
Conference stated in its final declaration that: 
[i]n . . . developing countries . . . [m]illions continue to live far 
below the minimum levels required for a decent human 
existence . . . [t]herefore, the developing countries must direct 
their efforts to development . . . [while] industrialized countries 
should make efforts to reduce the gap [for] themselves and the 
developing countries.140 
By making this statement, the Conference adhered to the notion that 
developing countries should simply worry about their economic development 
and deal with their environmental impact as a secondary and much later 
issue.141  In contrast, developed countries should step in and “take the lead in 
combating climate change,” and do so not only for themselves but for 
developing countries as well.142 
This unequal burden, justified by historical levels of emissions, has 
therefore been incorporated into environmental agreements and conferences 
from the UNFCCC to the Copenhagen Conference to the Kyoto Protocol.  
However, questions remain. How long should these differentiated 
responsibilities last?  Is this burden to be carried indefinitely?  Or, does it 
ultimately expire as time goes on and developing economies begin to 
produce more greenhouse gas emissions? 
There are also several strong rationales espoused against utilizing this 
principle, especially in an environmental agreement such as the Kyoto 
Protocol.  The first argument against using this principle targets the notion 
that binding obligations for developing countries will somehow unduly 
burden their economic development.  That notion arguably places too large 
of an emphasis on the economic concerns involved, and does so at the 
expense of environmental ones.143  By placing more emphasis on the 
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economies of these developing countries, instead of their environments, the 
international community is disregarding the gravity of the global warming 
problem and allowing developing countries to pollute in favor of their 
economies.144  Under this view, a focus on the environment is as important, if 
not more so, than a focus on the economy and its development.145  
Additionally, this argument emphasizes that “[b]y placing economic 
concerns ahead of environmental ones, the international community is 
ignoring the severity of the current global warming crisis,” which will 
ultimately have a net adverse effect on all countries.146 
Another case for not implementing the common but differentiated 
responsibilities principle is that studies have predicted that in the future it 
will be the developing countries that will cause much of the greenhouse gas 
emission damage.147  In fact, “[e]missions growth rates are highest among 
developing countries . . . , where collectively CO2 emissions increased by 
forty-seven percent over the 1990–2002 period.”148  In stark contrast, over 
the same time period, carbon dioxide emissions remained constant in 
developed countries149  Although this number is slightly misleading since 
some developed countries, like the United States and Australia, have actually 
increased their carbon dioxide emissions, the overall change for the 
developed countries was still a net neutral.150  This lack of growth illustrates 
that focusing exclusively on developed countries would not be effective, as it 
is the developing countries whose greenhouse gas emissions are 
exponentially increasing. 
Another reason advocated against the common but differentiated 
responsibilities principle, particularly against its implementation in the Kyoto 
Protocol, is that it at its most extreme it incentivizes developing countries to 
ignore their greenhouse gas emissions completely or, at the very least, it 
encourages them to not make emissions reduction a priority.151  By not 
requiring any commitment from the developing countries, the Kyoto 
Protocol “licenses a continuing wrong, allowing developing states to 
structure their industr[ies] in environmentally unfriendly and fossil fuel-
reliant directions.”152  The main concern is that developing countries will use 
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the leeway afforded to them by the Kyoto Protocol to not only further emit 
greenhouse gases but also, and perhaps more significantly, create permanent 
infrastructures that are fueled by carbon and prolong this problem for 
generations to come.153  However, if under a new Kyoto regime developing 
countries are required to abide by binding greenhouse emissions then they 
may be incentivized to build clean energy sources from the start, forcing 
them to address the greenhouse gas problem at its root. 
As a result of the changing situation in developing countries, the Kyoto 
Protocol’s focus on developing versus developed countries is no longer 
realistic.  The common but differentiated responsibilities principle, which the 
Kyoto Protocol utilizes in order to commit developed countries to binding 
targets while allowing developing countries to continue unhindered, cannot 
be maintained.  In a world where China and India are two of the largest 
greenhouse gas emitters, and where eleven of the top twenty-five gas 
emitters are non-Annex I countries,154 this common but differentiated 
responsibilities principle simply exacerbates the greenhouse gas problem and 
hinders the development of a legitimate solution. 
Thus, by allowing the common but differentiated responsibilities 
principle to control simply because there is a belief that “developed countries 
[should] acknowledge the responsibility that they bear . . . in view of the 
pressures their societies place on the global environment,” the Protocol is not 
addressing a large source of the greenhouse emission problem.155  China and 
India, along with the United States, the European Union, and Russia account 
for about 61% of greenhouse emissions.156  Of these five major greenhouse 
gas emitters, only India and China are left out of the binding obligations 
scheme due to the common but differentiated responsibilities principle,157 
while the United States will not ratify the Protocol because of the fact that 
large developing countries are not bound by the Protocol.158 
By not including developing countries that are emitting large levels of 
greenhouse gases from its binding mechanism, the Protocol will likely never 
make a significant impact on greenhouse gas emissions and, therefore, will 
fail in its purpose.  Similar observations have prompted organizations such as 
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the World Resource Institute (WRI), a well regarded environmental think 
tank,159 to insist that “it is simply not possible to adequately address the 
climate change problem without engaging both developed and developing 
countries.”160 
The developing-versus-developed issue was also at the forefront of 
discussions at the United Nations Climate Change Conference held in 
Copenhagen, Denmark.161  At this Fifteenth session of the COP, developed 
and developing nations disagreed when discussing whether developing 
countries should take on more vigorous and perhaps binding emission 
targets.162  The United States and other developed countries demanded that 
developing countries take on reporting and measurement obligations, while 
large developing economies such as China expressly rejected such 
demands.163 
Although no concrete agreement was reached at Copenhagen,164 the 
discussions held made it evident that the United States and other developed 
countries are not willing to sign on to an international environmental 
agreement that requires them to shoulder all the binding responsibilities of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.165  This reluctance and the fact that the 
world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, the United States, is unwilling to sign 
a new environmental agreement without the binding commitment of 
developing countries is an additional incentive to bind developing 
countries.166   
At the Seventeenth COP in Durban, South Africa this issue came up 
again.  Despite the European Union’s attempts to push “for . . . a ‘road map’ 
to a legally binding treaty, [they met] against fierce resistance from China 
and India, whose delegates argued passionately against it . . . [stating] that 
mandatory cuts would slow their growth and condemn millions to 
poverty.”167  Eventually, developing and developed countries seemed to 
agree that all nations should be bound; however, this agreement was not 
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binding, but was simply an “agreement to agree” at a future date.168  
Therefore, the agreement allows countries like China to potentially stall until 
2020 before being legally bound by the treaty.169   
Thus, although the Kyoto Protocol is to be renewed in January 2013, this 
second commitment period will not change the common but differentiated 
responsibilities principle but will allow developing countries to continue 
evading legally binding obligations.170  A new Kyoto Protocol must equalize 
the burdens between developed and developing nations in order to be 
effective.  Not only would such equalization ensure that the Protocol makes a 
significant impact by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but it would also 
ensure that heavily emitting developed countries are incentivized to sign-on.  
In fact, “[t]he United States never ratified the agreement because . . . [the 
Protocol] doesn't require any action from the developing world . . . [t]he 
Bush administration considered that a fatal flaw . . . [a]nd so does the Obama 
White House.”171  Additionally, the European Union, as evidenced in 
Durban, seems intent on getting a legally binding commitment for all 
nations.172  Furthermore, three of the major countries that signed the initial 
commitment, Japan, Russia and Canada, have refused to commit to a second 
period unless China and the United States are held to binding commitments 
as well.173  Therefore, in order to incentivize the United States as well as the 
European Union to join the Kyoto Protocol regime, the common but 
differentiated responsibilities doctrine must be done away with.  Doing away 
with this doctrine would, in turn, result in China and India being bound, 
thereby incentivizing Japan, Canada, and most importantly Russia, to sign on 
to another commitment period.174  By eliminating its common but 
differentiated responsibilities principle and simply focusing on binding 
targets for the top twenty-five greenhouse gas emitters, this new Kyoto 
Protocol would then include those countries that “contribute approximately 
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61 percent of global emissions.”175  These changes would put a new Kyoto 
Protocol on the right path to effective reduction of emissions. 
The top greenhouse gas emitters must be bound to a new Kyoto regime, 
as organizations such as the WRI have found that the top twenty-five 
emitters generate 83% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, with the 
remaining countries only generating 17%.176  Therefore, in order to tackle a 
significant portion of the problem, a new Kyoto Protocol must require, at a 
minimum, that the top twenty-five greenhouse gas emitters adhere to binding 
targets. 
Admittedly, eliminating this principle may be harder than it seems.  The 
Kyoto Protocol is linked to the UNFCCC, which also espouses the common 
but differentiated responsibilities principle.177  Therefore, although it is 
outside the scope of this Note, an additional issue to consider may be an 
amendment to the UNFCCC.  This Note will proceed under the assumption 
that amending the UNFCCC is possible. 
B.  Funding Issue 
Although developing countries should take on a more serious obligation 
under a new Kyoto Protocol framework and do away with the common but 
differentiated responsibilities principle, some remnants of the principle will 
inevitably need to be retained as developing and developed countries have 
different access to resources.  Historically, developed countries have 
contributed more to the environmental issues that are present today.178  
Nevertheless, developed countries should not be forever obligated to take the 
lead and thereby be forced to combat climate change for themselves as well 
as for developing countries.179  In order to address these competing 
rationales, there must be some sort of compromise.   
Perhaps the most fair and effective way to deal with this historical 
conundrum is to move forward by binding developing as well as developed 
countries to greenhouse gas emission targets.  However, in recognition of the 
burden this would place on the economies of the developing world, a new 
Protocol should also obligate developed countries to help finance the 
necessary infrastructures in developing nations in order to help make these 
binding obligations feasible.  
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Upon application of binding targets, many developing countries may have 
trouble abiding by their greenhouse gas emission goals “due to limited 
economic means, lack of technological know-how, and insufficient 
infrastructure.”180  Thus, their biggest concern may be balancing their 
tentative economic development while still taking into account 
environmental concerns.181  In a new Kyoto framework, developing countries 
can make their adherence to binding targets “conditional on the receipt of 
assistance from developed countries.”182  Maintaining this aspect of the 
common but differentiated responsibilities principle, while still binding both 
developed and developing countries, allows developed countries to share 
their environmental burden while helping developing countries shoulder their 
new financial burden.  
In recognition of the new burden being allotted to developing countries, 
developed countries can assist by contributing to a fund managed by an 
official of the Kyoto Protocol.  This fund will funnel the necessary resources 
to those developing countries that require them, and be managed by the 
UNFCCC, with some oversight by the donating country in order to allow 
assurance that their investment is being used appropriately.  This form of 
assistance should thereby help to alleviate some of the economic concerns of 
developing nations, by helping them build clean energy infrastructures 
without greatly hampering their economic development.  
The Copenhagen Accord, the political agreement of the Copenhagen 
Conference, envisioned a similar financial solution.183  The Accord included 
several financial elements: (1) a “collective commitment by developed 
countries . . . to provide new and additional resources . . . approaching USD 
30 billion”; (2) a longer term commitment by developed countries “to a goal 
of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020”; and (3) a 
Copenhagen Green Climate fund, which would be the “operating entity of 
the [Convention’s] financial mechanism.”184  All of these funding 
mechanisms were to be tied to actions showing meaningful mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions by the developing country receiving assistance.185  
However, because the Copenhagen Accord was never adopted by a 
consensus, and was simply taken note of, it is not a legally binding 
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instrument.186  Therefore, none of its recommendations were ever 
implemented.187  
The solution conceived of in the Copenhagen Accord could and should be 
implemented in a reinvigorated Kyoto Protocol.  One major advantage of this 
solution is it would likely have significant buy-in as the Copenhagen Accord 
was drafted by a group of about twenty-eight countries, including all of the 
major economies of the world.188  Additionally, “114 countries . . . associated 
themselves with the . . . Accord” and seventy-three of those countries, 
“representing more than 80 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions,” 
pledged to limit their emissions.189  Thus, a funding solution dictated by the 
Copenhagen Accord likely has the backing and support of numerous 
countries, including the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters.190   
All countries involved in the Copenhagen Accord discussions agreed that 
developing countries would need assistance in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions; however, developing and developed countries envisioned this 
funding differently.191  Developed countries believed that any financial 
assistance should be “linked to developing country mitigation 
commitments,” while developing countries believed that this funding was 
“payment of the ‘carbon debt’ that . . . developed countries owe[d] for their 
historical emissions.”192  However, despite this difference, the funding 
solution that eventually developed was in fact linked to mitigation action by 
the developing countries, demonstrating that there was eventually a 
consensus on the issue.193  Therefore, as over one hundred countries 
associated themselves with the Accord, and all the major economies were 
involved in drafting it, a solution contained within the Accord would likely 
have more buy-in than one created completely from scratch.194 
Another indication that a Copenhagen Accord-like solution would have 
significant buy-in is the decision to formally establish a Green Climate Fund 
at the Durban Conference.195  At the Durban Conference, countries 
“designate[d] the Green Climate Fund as an operating entity of the financial 
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mechanism of the Convention, in accordance with Article 11 of the 
Convention, with arrangements to be concluded between the Conference of 
the Parties and the Fund at the eighteenth session of the [c]onference of the 
Parties.”196  However, although the Conference officially made the Green 
Climate Fund part of its financial mechanism, it did not designate how the 
Green Climate Fund would be funded.197  The Conference simply established 
that developed countries would “boost funding for developing countries to 
US$100 billion annually by 2020.”198 
Therefore, although a fund was established, it remains to be determined 
how the Green Climate Fund will be financed.  Should the funding come 
exclusively from developed countries?  Or should private sources also be 
used?  One solution to this problem has already been contemplated in the 
Kyoto Protocol, via the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund.199  This Fund, 
developed during the Marrakesh Accords, “was established to finance 
concrete adaptation projects and programmes in developing country [p]arties 
to the Kyoto Protocol,” with financing to come from a “share of proceeds on 
the clean development mechanism project activities . . . amount[ing] to 2% 
of . . . [CERs] issued for a CDM project activity.”200  The idea of financing 
by using a percentage of CER’s issued per CDM project could be leveraged 
and utilized when funding the Green Climate Fund as well.  
Therefore, by implementing the Green Climate Fund solution crafted in 
the Copenhagen and Durban Conferences, and financing the fund not only 
via mandatory and voluntary contributions from developed countries, but 
also via a share of the proceeds of CDM projects, the new Kyoto Protocol 
would incentivize both developed and developing countries to sign a new 
commitment.  A new Kyoto Protocol should also follow the lead of the 
Copenhagen Accord by linking the receipt of funding to significant 
mitigation action from any developing country receiving assistance, which 
can shown by them taking on binding greenhouse gas commitments under 
the Kyoto Protocol.  
In taking a harder stance on developing countries, the new Protocol would 
garner greater buy-in from developed countries that have expressed 
dissatisfaction with this issue in the past.  The Protocol could, however, 
simultaneously incentivize developing countries to sign on by providing 
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them with the necessary financial assistance to meet their binding goals and 
thereby showing them that the world understands the difficulties they face in 
meeting their commitments.  
C.  Measures to Reduce Emissions and Market-Based Mechanisms 
Another issue that has arisen, mostly between developed countries, is how 
countries should adhere to their binding emissions targets.  Should they 
primarily implement national measures?  Or should they take full advantage 
of the mechanisms created by the Kyoto Protocol? 
The Kyoto Protocol affords Annex I countries multiple ways to meet their 
binding greenhouse gas emission targets.  It recommends national measures 
that countries can take in Article 2(1)(a) of the Protocol.201  It also allows 
Annex-I countries to meet their targets via three market-based mechanisms: 
the clean development mechanism (CDM), the emissions trading 
mechanism, and the joint implementation mechanism.202  The Kyoto 
Protocol, however, is careful to limit these market-based solutions.  In 
detailing its emissions trading and joint implementation mechanisms, the 
Protocol explicitly states that these mechanisms are supplemental to national 
measures for the purpose of meeting binding commitments.203  This concept 
of “supplementarity” stands for the idea that the “investor country has to 
pursue an independent climate policy apart from . . . [these market-based] 
measures,” and therefore cannot exclusively rely on these measures to meet 
its targets.204 
Although not limited in the text of the Protocol itself, the CDM was also 
made supplemental to national measures in the Marrakesh Accords.205  In its 
Addendum to the Report of the Marrakesh Accords, the COP clarified that 
under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, which details the CDM, use of the 
mechanism is to be supplemental to national measures, and that national 
measures should not only be used first, but must be the most significant 
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portion of the mitigation action taken.206  Consequently, because non-Annex 
I countries are not held to binding commitments, the Marrakesh Accords 
only held Annex I countries to this supplementarity criterion.  It did not 
restrict those states hosting the CDM projects to this criterion, thus leaving 
the supplementarity criterion as a restriction upon only developed 
countries.207  This oversight thus allows developing countries to take 
advantage of CDM-based projects without first being bound to utilize 
national measures to reduce their own emissions. 
The issue of supplementarity was also heavily discussed during the 
Copenhagen Conference, where there was a split between developed 
countries as to which methods should be used most aggressively going 
forward.208  The European Union member states pushed for emissions 
reduction via domestic measures while the “United States . . . [and] Australia 
and Japan[ ] push[ed] for the unrestricted use of market-based 
mechanisms.”209   
The argument that countries should utilize primarily domestic measures 
and minimize use of the Kyoto Protocol’s market-based mechanisms stems 
from the idea that allowing developed countries to use CDM projects and 
other such mechanisms to meet their targets “can be at odds with the 
principle of joint but differentiated responsibility, which requires 
that . . . states . . . enact climate policies at home.”210  By allowing developed 
countries to reduce their emissions via certified emission reduction units, 
some argue that the countries are not reducing their own emissions, as 
dictated in the Kyoto Protocol, but are in fact “distort[ing] the wording and 
original goal of the provision.”211 
However, there are also strong arguments in support of market-based 
mechanisms, and specifically of the CDM.  By allowing developed countries 
to fund projects in developing countries and receive credits for their funding 
the CDM helps with two aspects of climate change: “industrialized 
economies can fund environment-friendly projects in an effort to receive 
carbon credits . . . [and] developing countries [can] support their economies 
in a sustainable way because of the funding from industrialized countries.”212  
The CDM is seen as the best way to encourage developing countries to 
reduce emissions while also helping them promote sustainable 
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development.213  Furthermore, the CDM allows both developed and 
developing countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in a more 
cost-effective manner, thereby making adherence to binding obligations 
easier and more cost-effective.214 
The CDM system would, of course inevitably change if developed and 
developing nations had binding obligations, in that all of them would have an 
incentive to utilize the mechanism to offset their emissions in order to meet 
their binding targets.  However, the CDM could still work in such an 
environment, and would arguably work more cohesively within the new 
Kyoto framework. 
For example, a country like the United States, which would already be 
contributing to a fund in order to help developing countries build clean 
infrastructures, would register a CDM project in a developing country like 
India.  This project, if approved, would give the United States carbon 
certified emission reductions and contribute to their emission reduction 
goals.215  Additionally, a percentage of these certified emission reduction 
credits would go to help fund the Green Climate Fund.216   This project, 
however, would also assist the developing nation in this example.  India, via 
this CDM project, would have an emission-reducing project implemented in 
its country, a project that would effectively reduce India’s greenhouse gas 
emissions, thus making India’s compliance goals easier to fulfill, and 
promoting sustainable development in the country.  Additionally, India 
would receive funding to build further clean energy sources from the 
percentage of CERs contributed to the Green Climate Fund from that CDM 
project.  Thus, India would receive financing as well as a clean-energy CDM 
project to help it meet its new binding emissions targets.  
In a world where both developing and developed countries have binding 
obligations, the CDM would ensure not only that the developed nation could 
meet its greenhouse gas emission targets, but also that it would assist 
developing nations in doing so by implementing projects with clean energy 
sources.   
Additionally, if both developed and developing countries are committed 
to binding targets, the concept of supplementarity would no longer apply 
only to developed nations.217  The developing nation would have to 
implement national measures first, and do so before utilizing the emission 
                                                                                                                   
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 12. 
 216 Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change Consensus: Emerging International Law, 34 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 582–83 (2010). 
 217 Winter, supra note 204, at 20. 
2012] LET THEM EAT CARBON  249 
 
reductions generated from CDM projects.  Therefore, the concept of 
supplementarity would apply to developing countries in the inverse.  
Although the CDM project would technically be within the developing 
country’s borders, they would have to implement other national measures, 
unrelated to market-based mechanisms, first.  By this means, the new Kyoto 
Protocol would ensure that developing and developed countries were both 
implementing national measures before taking advantage of market-based 
mechanisms like the CDM. 
Consequently, if a new Protocol puts a stringent cap on the amount of 
reductions allowed via market-based mechanisms, such as the CDM, it 
would make the cost of adherence to greenhouse gas targets higher for both 
developed and developing nations, as the CDM mechanism provides 
monetary benefits for both developed and developing nations..218  Therefore, 
because one of the major concerns for developing nations in committing to 
binding targets is that they cannot commit the necessary resources to the 
climate change problem, limiting such a cost-effective method would be 
counter-productive in incentivizing them to commit.219  Additionally, if a cap 
were placed on the amount of reductions allowed via the CDM this would 
hinder financing for the Green Climate Fund, part of which would come 
from a percentage of the certified emission reduction credits.220  Thus, the 
more CDM projects, the more credits, and the more funding provided.  
Therefore, although undoubtedly, an unfettered use of market-based 
mechanisms would run afoul of the Protocol’s purpose to have countries 
reduce their own emissions, putting a stringent cap on the CDM would not 
only result in higher costs for developing countries, but would also hinder 
funding for these countries. 
VI.  CONCLUSION: A NEW INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT IS NECESSARY 
Climate change is a global issue that requires a global commitment.  
Studies predict that if greenhouse gas emissions continue as they are “the 
global average surface temperature is expected to rise by 0.2°C to 0.4°C per 
decade throughout the 21st century and would continue to rise thereafter.  
The cumulative warming by 2100 would [thus] be approximately 3°C 
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to 5°C. . . .”221  This will result in more than just an increase in day-to-day 
temperatures.  It will shift climate zones, destroy forests, endanger 
ecosystems such as mountains and wetlands, result in a surge of diseases, 
and affect agricultural and fishery production, thus resulting in the risk of 
famine.222  These drastic effects require that the world come together to 
design a global solution that will not only be acceptable to both developing 
and developed countries but also be effective at fighting global warming.   
Such a solution demands that the common but differentiated 
responsibilities principle is not utilized in a reinvigorated Kyoto Protocol.  
This change to the Protocol would necessitate that the top twenty-five 
greenhouse gas emitters, whether they be developed or developing countries, 
contribute equally to reducing emissions by committing to binding 
greenhouse gas targets.   
At the same time, an effective global agreement requires that developed 
nations, who have stronger economies and have historically contributed more 
to the climate change problem, help their developing country brothers by 
funding clean infrastructures in those countries.  Funding can be managed 
via the Green Climate Fund, which is now part of the financial mechanism of 
the Kyoto Protocol.  Financing for the fund would come from voluntary and 
mandatory contributions from developed countries, as well as from a 
percentage of the CER credits of CDM projects.  Additionally, to ensure that 
both developed and developing nations are willing to commit, mechanisms 
like the CDM cannot be strictly capped as they provide the most cost-
effective way to meet binding emissions targets. 
If these issues are addressed, and the interests of both developed and 
developing nations are balanced, a new Kyoto Protocol would present a 
viable solution to the climate change problem.  However, if, like at the 
Durban Conference, nations continue to kick the can down the road and 
simply make agreements to agree, the problem of greenhouse gas emissions 
and global warming will only become more pervasive in the future. 
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